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4. Where the wild things are:
Evolving futures of 
communications regulation in the 
current national security context
In March 2008, the Australian Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA) released a report dealing with the possible implications of the 
‘top six trends’ in communications and media technologies, applications 
and services. The report highlights the fact that key regulatory elements 
in the communications environment are being conceptually ‘stretched and 
pulled’ by the accelerating pace of change in communications technologies, 
applications and services. The report also notes that in the longer term, there 
will be increasing overlapping developments in technology and increasing 
interconnections between people, databases and objects. This article will 
explore the evolving futures of communications regulation in the current 
national security context by focusing on the post-‘9/11’ regulatory response 
in Australia. Communications have long been regarded as ‘the fundamental 
cornerstone of intelligence and law enforcement’. For this reason, in the 
current national security context, this article will argue that the evolving 
futures of communications regulation will be increasingly calibrated with 
national security policy. 
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Introduction
IN MARCH 2008, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) released a report dealing with the possible implications of the ‘top six trends’ in communications and media 
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technologies, applications and services (ACMA, 2008). The report highlights 
the fact that key regulatory elements in the communications environment are 
being conceptually ‘stretched and pulled’ by the accelerating pace of change 
in communications technologies, applications and services (ACMA, 2008, 
p. 1). The report also notes that in the longer term, there will be increasing 
overlapping developments in technology and increasing interconnections 
between people, databases and objects (ACMA, 2008, p. 3). Further, the report 
notes that ‘while large companies are likely to continue to dominate the 
provision of infrastructure and many communications and media services, their 
business models are changing. Niche players, third parties, network 
collaborators, innovative business models and individual users are providing 
alternatives in internationalised markets’ (ACMA, 2008, p. 3). The report 
also argues for a sustainable regulatory framework which is responsive to 
change and can accommodate new dynamics (ACMA, 2008, p.3). What 
is missing from the analysis of the ‘top six trends’ is an evaluation of the 
changes to the communications regulatory environment as a consequence of 
the post-‘9/11’ national security agenda.  
This article will explore the evolving futures of communications 
regulation in the current national security context by focusing on the post-‘9/11’ 
regulatory response in Australia. Communications have long been regarded 
as ‘the fundamental cornerstone of intelligence and law enforcement’ (ACA, 
2005, p.26; Hills, 2005, p.195). For this reason, in the current national security 
context, this article will argue that the evolving futures of communications 
regulation will be increasingly calibrated with national security policy. This 
article will also contend that the multi-layered communications regulatory 
environment complicates this calibration. 
The article will briefly analyse some of the challenges and implications 
of the current national security context by reviewing the key legal and policy 
initiatives introduced by the Howard Government (and seemingly accepted 
by the new Rudd Government) since 11 September 2001 which affect the 
regulation of:
communications infrastructure•	  which comprises the cables, wires 
and airwaves over which data flows, and includes telecommunica-
tions services such as carriage or carriage services; 
applications•	  which includes services such as search engines and 
social networking applications and software applications such as 
content filtering and encryption software; and 
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content•	  which includes, among other things, film and literature 
classification and broadcasting content. 
This part of the article will also consider the impact and influence of 
communications stakeholders on national security law and policy. 
It is commonplace to discuss the post-‘9/11’ national security legisla-
tion and policy in terms of the impact on democracy, freedom of speech 
and censorship. However before we can sensibly embark on a discussion 
of the ideological and political ‘reach’ of the new regulatory framework for 
communications industry stakeholders and citizens alike and the further 
changes that are envisaged, the technostructural underpinnings of the desired 
political objectives requires closer consideration. It is engagement with this 
practical dimension of regulation that is currently least developed in Australia. 
My concern is for what this might mean for broader debates about the surveil-
lance society and for the future of Australian communications regulation.
Challenges of the security-communications regulatory interface
Communications have been undergoing unprecedented structural, 
institutional and regulatory change over the last decade (ACMA, 2008, p.3). 
The structural reality of the contemporary communications environment 
is that of a multilayered, trans and multinational regulatory environment 
serving many functions, not least of which is national security (ACMA, 2005, 
p.i). Rapid change in communications technology has ushered in a new era 
of trans and multinational regulation, both formal and informal (Bowrey, 
2005, pp.19-21). The same rapid change has likewise guaranteed a shortfall 
between regulation and the communications networks they seek to regulate 
or to track (Berg & Tobin, 2007, pp. 32-36; Bronitt & Stellios, 2006, p. 414). 
This is nowhere more apparent than in the case of the internet which, with 
new and emerging technologies and applications, lies close to the heart of 
the battle against terrorism in the post-September 11 era (ACA, 2005, p. 14; 
Weimann, 2006, pp. 173 -202; Andrejevic, 2006, p. 442). This is a complex-
ity that polarised debates focusing on the excess or dearth of anti-terrorist 
communications regulation have difficulty tracking. 
In order to focus the analysis, the paper will concentrate on a selection 
of post-September 11 legislative amendments which attracted attention 
from the communications sector stakeholders. This part of the article will 
canvass the communications-related national security legislation as it relates to 
 PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 14 (2) 2008  53 
THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO KNOW
licensing, provision of services which may be prejudicial to national security, 
interception and interception capability, and content regulation. 
Licensing and national security
According to Raiche, the Telecommunications Act 1997 provides the 
legislative basis for Australia’s telecommunications industry (Raiche, 2004, 
p.1). Within this regulatory structure, licensing of services is a cornerstone 
of Australian telecommunications. Under the Telecommunications Act a 
person may apply to the Australian Communications and Media Authority 
(the ACMA) for a carrier licence so long as the person is a constitutional 
corporation, a partnership of such corporations or a public body (Telecom-
munications Act 1997).  According to Senator Ian Campbell in his second 
reading speech on the Communications Legislation Amendment (No. 1) 
Act 2004, the pre-2004 licensing framework in the Telecommunications 
Act failed to take into consideration national security and law enforcement 
interests. No consideration of national security issues was required as part of 
the carrier licensing process. 
From a regulatory perspective, Senator Campbell points out that the 
licensing authority, the Australian Communications Authority (now the 
Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA)) was under no 
obligation to consult with the relevant national security and law enforcement 
agencies prior to issuing a carrier licence to an applicant. It was regarded as 
a problem by the Howard Government that national security grounds were 
not expressly provided for in the carrier licensing approval process. Senator 
Campbell pointed out that the grounds for refusing a carrier licence are broad, 
but did not explicitly mention national security. The enactment of Communi-
cations Legislation Amendment (No. 1) Act 2004 (the Communications Act) 
sought to remedy this perceived problem. 
The security-focused amendments to the Telecommunications Act 1997 
in 2004 were justified on the basis that they would ensure that national 
security and law enforcement interests were considered in the carrier licensing 
process. Today, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) 
must consult with the Communications Access Co-ordinator, the new 
regulator situated in the Attorney-General’s Department, prior to granting a new 
carrier licence. The Communications Act gave the Attorney-General the 
power to direct the ACMA to refuse to grant a carrier licence on national 
security grounds. This direction can only be made in consultation with the 
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Prime Minister and relevant Minister. Senator Ian Campbell explained in the 
Second Reading Speech of the Communications Act that 
the package of amendments contained in [the Communications Act] 
will lead to more secure telecommunications networks and services 
and improved arrangements for the provision of assistance to law 
enforcement agencies by telecommunications carriers and carriage 
service providers.
However, such significant changes to the carrier licensing procedures 
attracted minimal attention from the telecommunications industry, arguably 
the industry most affected by the changes.
Provision of services—prejudicial to national security
Vodafone, the only telecommunications company to make a submission 
to the Senate Inquiry relating to the Communications Act, explained in its 
submission to the inquiry:
[A]s a carrier and carriage service provider to [over 2.5 million  
customers in Australia], Vodafone is concerned that, as presently 
drafted, the Bill will confer very wide discretionary powers to restrict 
Vodafone’s legitimate business practices, which powers appear to go 
well beyond what may reasonably be required to protect Australia’s 
national security interests. (Vodafone, 2003, p. 1) 
Vodafone was also particularly concerned about the effect of the power 
of the Attorney-General to ‘direct carriers and carriage service providers 
not to use or supply, or to cease using or supplying (at all or to particular 
persons) a carriage service or all carriage services where such use or supply is 
considered to be prejudicial to national security’ (Vodafone, 2003, p.1). 
Vodafone’s concerns stemmed from the scope of the power to impact upon 
the livelihood of businesses and individuals working in the telecommunica-
tions industry. Vodafone further submitted that:
As summarised in the Bills Digest to the Bill, the unacceptable  
consequence of the present drafting of section 581(3) is that:
...on a strict reading of the amendments proposed in the Bill, …  
decisions by the Attorney-General affecting the business and livelihood 
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of people in the telecommunications industry can be based on subjective 
judgments [sic] of the national security situation with little prospect of 
any successful review by the courts. (Vodafone, 2003, p. 1)
In the same submission, Vodafone reiterated its support for the underlying 
policy objectives of the Bill and in doing so, identified one of the quandaries 
of the regulatory interface—how communications industry participants can 
reconcile their legitimate business interests with national security interests. 
Vodafone added that:
Vodafone acknowledges that it is necessary and appropriate for  
Government to have adequate powers to protect Australia’s national 
security, particularly given the current domestic and global security 
environment.  Vodafone is committed to its statutory obligations to 
assist in this task, and already provides a very high degree of assistance 
to government agencies in this respect. (Vodafone, 2003, p. 1)
Historically, as noted by Jill Hills, national governments have always had 
the power to direct communications companies to cease the supply of 
communications services, such as the telegraph, for reasons of national 
security, most notably in times of war (Hills, 2006, p.197). The concept 
of carrier has a deceptive simplicity about it, particularly in the Australian 
communications environment where only a handful of licensed carriers 
operate. Before the deregulation of the telecommunications sector in the 
mid-nineties, the regulatory environment was even more uncomplicated as 
there was only one carrier, Telstra. However, thinking about this issue in 
terms of the ‘top six trends’ in the communications environment, how will 
this power be used in the future when niche players, third parties, network 
collaborators and individual users are providing alternatives to carrier 
services in internationalised markets? The issue is of practical concern—to 
whom will the power be directed and in what circumstances? 
Interception and interception capability
Bronitt and Stellios have shown that the telecommunications interception 
regime has been expanding in both scope and scale since the 1980s (Bronitt 
& Stellios, 2006, p. 414). The telecommunications interception regime has 
been amended a number of times in the past decade to take into account 
advances in technology and the need for more responsive regulation to old and 
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new crimes using new and emerging technology (Bronitt & Stellios, 2006, 
p. 414). For example, the amendments introduced in 1999 were justified by 
then Attorney-General Daryl Williams on the basis that law enforcement and 
national security agencies needed tools to keep up to date with technolo- 
gical changes, organised crime, arsonists, child pornographers and terrorists. 
Bronitt and Stellios have tracked the regulation of telecommunications 
interception and have shown that the regulatory framework has shifted from 
being primarily that of an investigative tool to a national surveillance scheme 
for serious crime in the federal and state jurisdictions (Bronitt & Stellios, 
2006, p. 414). They have characterised the 2006 changes to the interception 
regime as moving beyond ‘function creep’ (Bronitt & Stellios, 2006, p. 415) 
arguing that:
[T]he amendments are a watershed in the history of interception law 
in Australia, heralding a major conceptual shift albeit under the guise 
of technical improvement. Under these reforms, the scheme moved 
beyond ‘live’ interception to include access to stored data. In simple 
terms, a warrant scheme originally devised to permit interception of 
communications has been extended into a power to search and seize 
stored communications data. (Bronitt & Stellios, 2006, p. 415)
Under the Telecommunications (Interception and Amendment) Act 1979 
(as amended), a telecommunications network must be ‘capable of intercep-
tion’. The industry raised a number of issues associated with the interception 
capability requirements found in the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Amendment) Amendment Act 2007. The Australian Mobile Telecommunica-
tions Association (AMTA) noted in its submission that:
The redefinition of Interception Capability, rather than using the 
term from the Telecommunications Act 1997 has the potential for 
serious, even if unintended, consequences for Carriers and Carriage 
Service Providers. AMTA is concerned that the proposed definition 
includes any equipment connected to a telecommunications network.  
Provision of services in an Internet environment involves use of a 
variety of separate components that are clearly defined in the Tel-
ecommunications Act 1997, including customer equipment, carriage 
services, that is, the carrying of internet ‘packets’ across networks and  
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internet applications and content services, such as instant messaging and 
web hosting. For the most part Internet applications, content services 
and customer equipment can be independent of the Carrier or CSP.  
(Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association, 2007, p. 2)
The point raised by the AMTA has practical consequences. The 
architecture of the internet with its multiple layers, protocols and genera-
tive processes make this independence possible (Zittrain, 2008, pp. 67-71). 
Further, the broad definitions now incorporated into the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 may mean that many services may be 
classed as ‘telecommunications services’, such as Google and Microsoft's 
Suite of new and diverse offerings. Furthermore, there are also many new 
creators of ‘telecommunications data’, for example, social networking sites 
such as YouTube and MySpace. There are search engine services such as 
Google and platforms such as Microsoft, which provides a range of services 
from instant messaging to document management. The broad definition has 
the potential to capture these new services. The problem highlighted by the 
ATMA has relevance to the nature of the digital communications environment. 
Yet the current framing of the interception capability requirements means 
that the responsibility rests with the licensed carrier or nominated carriage 
service provider. 
In February 2008, the newly elected Federal Labor Government, 
under the leadership of Kevin Rudd, introduced the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Amendment Bill 2008. According to the explanatory 
memorandum, the Bill would, among other things, permit the interception 
of multiple telecommunications devices on the one ‘named person warrant’ 
(Explanatory Memorandum, Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Amendment Bill 2008).
The Bill was subject to a Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee 
Inquiry. The Bill was not without controversy despite assurances from the 
new Labor Attorney-General, Robert McClelland, that the Bill ‘contains no 
new powers for security or law enforcement agencies in relation to telecom-
munications interception, stored communications or access to data.’ The 
Attorney-General further explained that the amendments were necessary so 
that security and law enforcement agencies would have contemporary powers 
to deal with crime in an era of rapid technological change. 
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The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment Act 2008 
was passed in May 2008. Interestingly, no carrier, carriage service provider 
or relevant communications industry association made a submission to the 
Senate Committee Inquiry. The amended telecommunications intercep-
tion framework now permits extensive lawful interception of Australian 
citizens across services, platforms, devices and data fields through a variety of 
warrant and authorisation processes. The complexity of the interception 
multiplies when considered in light of the current communications environment. 
Different carriers, devices and services are converging over multiple devices. 
By combining the devices and services with the ‘telecommunications data’ 
(which is produced in the environment) a monumental information flow re-
sults. Also, in the Internet environment, the regulatory line between access 
to the content of communications (which requires a warrant) and access to 
telecommunications data (which requires an authorisation) becomes somewhat 
blurred.  It is surprising then, if not alarming, that no communications stake-
holder made a submission to the Senate Committee about this Bill despite its 
obvious ‘work generating’ capacity.
Internet Protocols—interception capability and ownership
National security regulation occurs by way of telecommunications inter-
ception but only if a particular service can be intercepted at the physical 
layer or infrastructure level. This means that if a service uses network and 
transport systems which fall outside of the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act interception framework, such as an Internet Protocol based 
service, then those systems will not be subject to national security regulation 
from a telecommunications interception point of view. Yet, as the AMTA 
has noted, the responsibility for those services may end up falling with the 
carriers and carriage service providers for the reason that their services fall 
within the regulatory categories in the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act. 
Internet Protocol based services, such as Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP), exemplify the regulatory complexity in the regulation of internet 
protocols and the associated difficulties surrounding national security regula-
tion. For example, in its submission to the Senate Inquiry into provisions of 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access Amendment) Bill 2007, in 
its submission, the Attorney-General’s Department hinted that ‘RFC 2822’, 
an Internet Protocol, (IETF, www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2822.txt?number=2822, 
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retrieved 14 September 2007) may be used to determine the substance of 
‘telecommunications data’ under the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 (as amended) even though the RFC 2822 requirements are 
not included in any definition in the Act. The matter was raised in response 
to privacy concerns about the broad definition of ‘telecommunications data’ 
raised by Electronic Frontiers Australia and the Commonwealth Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner during the Senate Inquiry.
As explained by Bowrey, a ‘request for comments’  (RFC) is a voluntary 
standard and compliance with an RFC is about achieving ‘the level of function-
ality that comes with adopting a tried and tested ‘best practice’ (Bowrey, 2005, 
p. 3). The International Engineering Task Force, an external non-government 
body, looks after the drafting, review and publishing of the RFCs (Bowrey, 
2005, p.3). Bowrey explains that ‘there is no law of the internet that says a 
site or network must be compliant’ (Bowrey, 2005, p. 3). 
It is quite possible that some telecommunications services are configured 
on the basis of the old RFC 822 or not RFC compliant at all. The important 
issue in respect of national security regulation will be the actual role of RFC 
2822 and its relationship to the definition of ‘telecommunications data’. 
Telecommunications data is not a defined term in the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979. The Telecommunications Act 1997 uses 
‘communications’, which includes any communication:(a) whether between 
persons and persons, things and things or persons and things; and (b) whether 
in the form of speech, music or other sounds; and (c) whether in the form of 
data; and (d) whether in the form of text; and (e) whether in the form of visual 
images (animated or otherwise); and (f) whether in the form of signals; and (g) 
whether in any other form; and (h) whether in any combination of forms. 
The Explanatory Memorandum provides the following explanation of 
‘telecommunications data’:
Telecommunications data is information about a telecommunication, 
but does not include the content or substance of the communica-
tion. Telecommunications data is available in relation to all forms of  
communications, including both fixed and mobile telephony services 
and for internet based applications including internet browsing and 
voice over internet telephony. For telephone-based communications, 
telecommunications data includes subscriber information, the telephone 
numbers of the parties involved, the time of the call and its duration.  
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In relation to internet based applications, telecommunications data  
includes the Internet Protocol (IP) address used for the session, the websites  
visited, and the start and finish time of each session. Telecommunica-
tions data specifically excludes the content or substance of a com-
munication. Currently, the use and disclosure of this data is generally 
prohibited under sections 276, 277 and 278 of the Telecommunications 
Act. Sections 282 and 283 allow access to this data for specific law 
enforcement and national security purposes.
The issue revolves around what actually constitutes ‘telecommunications 
data’ for the purposes of the Act. There is no guidance on whether RFC 2822 
is a guideline or whether compliance will be mandatory.  Nor does RFC 2822 
necessarily provide the data which comprises ‘telecommunications data’ as 
described in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Bill, given that it is only 
a voluntary standard (despite the high level of compliance with the protocol 
(Bowrey, 2005, p. 3).  The concept of ‘telecommunications data’ is an open-
ended concept which provides little certainty for industry or citizens about 
what information will be comprised in ‘telecommunications data’.  
Data, as Bowrey explains, is ‘used to identify us and speak for who we 
are’ in a limited way: 
Data is collected, collated and transmitted. Data is used to identify us 
and speak for who we are. But our identity is only revealed through the 
databases largely generated by the records of our choices and actions. 
The related political concern here is that our agency or capacities as 
citizens have already become confined by and through these webs and 
networks. We cannot expect the state to intervene on our behalf, to 
address our other needs, interests or desires. The nation state will only 
identify us as consumers of services signified by the data that represents 
us, or see us as threats to the network, the state and ultimately other citi-
zens, requiring a strategic, political response. (Bowrey, 2005, p. 179)
For this reason, an open-ended concept of ‘telecommunications data’ 
allows national security and law enforcement agencies access (for law 
enforcement and national security purposes) to an on-line universe of known, 
available or future (prospective) information which is being collected, 
collated and transmitted by telecommunications services. Moreover, the unique 
regulatory environment of the internet means that a voluntary standard such 
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as an RFC may determine what ‘telecommunications data’ means for the 
purposes of the telecommunications interception regime. 
Communications applications—interception and service restrictions
Communications and media applications, such as the world wide web or 
social networking applications, such as FaceBook, can be indirectly 
intercepted through the telecommunications services or infrastructure owned 
and operated by a carrier or carriage service provider. The object of the 
interception is to capture the data flows. According to Zittrain, the 
applications represent the tasks which people are able to perform on the 
internet, such as searching for information or social networking (Zittrain, 2008, 
pp. 67-71). What an individual searches for and with whom they associate are 
relevant in the current national security context. The informal context of 
regulation of the internet means that many applications remain unregulated. In this 
respect, the effectiveness of the national security legislative framework 
is difficult to map. The tools of technology, such as steganography and 
encryption, allow anyone, for good or ill, to hide their activities and 
communications (Branch, 2003, p. 38). 
The Communications Act provides the Attorney-General with the power 
to direct the cease of supply of a carriage service. The second reading speech 
explains that: 
Under the Communications Act, the Attorney-General, in consultation 
with the Prime Minister and the Minister administering the Telecom-
munications Act, may direct a person not to use or supply, or to cease 
using or supplying, a carriage service or all carriage services to itself 
or any other person on national security grounds. 
The Second Reading speech notes, the direction is ‘wide-ranging and may 
be issued with respect to particular individuals, groups or existing telecom-
munications industry participants, whose activities pose a risk to national 
security’. 
As mentioned previously, governments have had the power to control 
communications in this manner since the St Petersburg Convention of the late 
1800s (Hills, 2006, p. 197). According to Hills, this convention codified the 
powers of national governments with respect to telecommunications as a matter 
of national security (Hills, 2006, p. 197). For example, under Article 7 of the 
 62  PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 14 (2) 2008
THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO KNOW
St Petersburg Convention, the parties had the power to stop the transmission 
of any private telegram which may appear dangerous to the security of the 
state, or which may be contrary to the laws of the country, to public order, or 
to decency (Hills, 2006, p. 197).
In the current communications regulatory environment, this is a difficult 
power to define. From a practical perspective, which services does the govern-
ment mean? How does one identify a service as a threat to national security 
and what happens if the threat does not originate with an Australian carrier? 
For example, would Google Earth or Google Map’s Street View and its 
various other embodiments qualify? Does the power propose to stop the supply 
of the internet? Given the nature of the internet and its nodal, decentralised, 
structure, it would be difficult for the Australian government to order a cessa-
tion of supply without agreement in the international regulatory framework. 
The international regulatory framework is beyond the scope of this article. 
However, important issues of ownership, access, use, interception and censor-
ship play a role in this regulatory scenario and involve international state and 
non-state actors. The complexity of addressing this issue should be apparent 
from consideration of existing international debate about the existing use of 
powers over telecommunications and the Internet in authoritarian regimes.
Similar to the power to direct the ACMA to refuse a carrier licence 
on national security grounds, it was explained in the Communications Act 
second reading speech that the Attorney-General would exercise the power to 
direct a person to cease using or supplying a carriage service only in extreme 
circumstances where the risk to national security cannot be managed effectively 
through other mechanisms. With developments in the diversity of physical 
infrastructure flagged as a top six trend by the ACMA (AMCA, 2008, 4), 
reliance on the regulatory concept of carrier may have serious implications 
for the efficacy of this power to meet the policy objectives of the national 
security policy agenda. 
Content regulation and national security
The national security legislative framework regulates content through film 
and literature classification, broadcasting content control, reporting restric-
tions on the media in respect of national security matters and the criminal 
offence of sedition.  The criminal law will apply to communications and 
media content if the transmission of that content constitutes a criminal 
offence within the scope of the Criminal Code Act 1995, for example, 
 PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 14 (2) 2008  63 
THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO KNOW
possessing and communicating child pornography using a carriage service 
(Fitzgerald, et.al, 2007, p. 681). 
The rapidly evolving communications environment poses unique difficul-
ties for carriers and carriage service providers in respect of content regulation 
for national security purposes. The responsibility for filtering criminal (which 
includes terrorist content) and offensive content is increasingly falling on the 
shoulders of communications industry stakeholders, such as Internet Service 
Providers and Internet Content Hosts. The development and implementation 
of new technologies will enable service providers to block, shape, monitor 
and prioritise internet traffic flows over their networks. The issues surrounding 
these kinds of activities range from the adequacy and efficacy of the filtering 
products to the appropriateness of communications industry stakeholders 
acting as ‘rough censors’ (Hills, 2006, p. 198) for the government. 
The Anti-Terrorism Act (No.2) Act 2005 introduced the revised and updated 
offence of sedition. Bronitt and Stellios have noted that ‘the revival of the 
interest in sedition was a direct response to recent terrorist attacks, and was 
presented as part of a package of counter-terrorism measures by the Howard 
Government’ (Bronitt & Stellios, 2006, p. 196). Before this revival, sedition 
had an unpleasant political history of being used against people, from artists to 
political opponents, who spoke out against the government (Bronitt & Stellios, 
2006, p. 196).  In 2007, the Howard Government successfully expanded the 
national security legislative framework into the film and literature classification 
regime by passing legislation which placed restrictions on access to ‘terrorism-
related materials’ (Classification	(Publications,	Films	and	Computer	Games)	
Amendment (Terrorist Material) Act 2007).
Obligations currently exist where internet service providers must report 
users accessing criminal content, such as child pornography (Fitzgerald, 
et.al, 2007, p. 753). With improvements in content and network management 
capabilities, perhaps the future of communications regulation may tend 
towards even more ‘rough censorship’ by communications industry stake-
holders, which may include the reporting of those who generate and access 
seditious content. 
The Broadcasting Services (Anti-Terrorism Requirements for Open 
Narrowcasting Television Services) Standard 2006 restricts the broadcasting 
of certain content on open narrowcasting services. The standard resulted from 
an investigation into the broadcast of the Lebanon-based satellite television 
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channel Al Manar by the subscription television narrowcasting licensee 
Television and Radio Broadcasting Services Australia Pty Limited (TARBS) 
on 5 November 2003 (ACMA, 2004, Press Release). During the investigation, 
the Australian Broadcasting Authority (as it then was) considered whether:
…certain material in programmes provided by Al Manar was in breach 
of Federal anti-terrorism laws, including material that appeared to solicit 
funds for organizations linked with terrorism. It concluded that if such 
material were broadcast with the intent to solicit funds and the broad-
caster was reckless as to whether or not the funds would be used for 
terrorism purposes, it could constitute a use of the broadcasting service 
in the commission of an offence. (ACMA, 2004, ABA Investigation into 
Al Manar programming on TARBS, News Release, 22 October 2004, 
www.acma.gov.au, retrieved on 6 September 2006)
The investigation was never finalised, however, the Broadcasting Services 
(Anti-terrorism Requirements for Open Narrowcasting Television Services) 
Standard 2006 was passed in March 2006. The object of the standard is to 
prevent the broadcasting of programs that encourage people to join or fi-
nance terrorist organisations (Broadcasting Services (Anti-terrorism Require-
ments for Open Narrowcasting Television Services) Standard 2006, s 3) The 
standard, among other things, does not prevent the licensee from reporting 
the news, expressing a political opinion or broadcasting a programme that 
merely gives information about, or promotes beliefs or opinions of, a ter-
rorist organization (Broadcasting Services (Anti-terrorism Requirements for 
Open Narrowcasting Television Services) Standard 2006, ss 8 and 9).
Ordinary commercial and subscription television broadcasters are 
governed by their relevant Industry Codes of Practice and licence conditions 
as set out in the Broadcasting Services Act 1992.  All broadcasting services are 
prohibited from using the broadcasting licence to commission an offence. The 
narrowcasting standard highlights the limitations of the regulatory framework 
to effectively regulate for national security purposes. The standard only applies 
to narrowcasting services licensed under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992. 
Internet Protocol based television (IPTV) reveal that certain services continue 
to remain outside the regulatory frameworks for content. 
The shift towards security focused communications regulation
Taken together, the changes to communications regulation in the interests 
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of national security after 11 September, 2001, which include ‘the almost 
constant pattern of revision of the telecommunications interception 
framework’ (Bronitt & Stellios, 2006, p. 414), and the broader amendments 
covering telecommunications licensing, classification of terrorism-related 
content, sedition, restrictions on press freedoms, secrecy, terrorism advocacy 
and narrowcasting content standards, demonstrate a marked shift towards 
security-focused communications regulation. Yet there are multiple points of 
contact in the national security-communications regulatory interface running 
in parallel which get lost in a discourse which is focused on human rights, 
loss of privacy, press freedom and free speech. 
The surveillance society?
Private and public activities, some of which are legal and others which are 
illegal, some of which are innocent and others that are dishonest, are 
undertaken with the help of communications and information technology 
systems, from the classroom to the café; from working-from-home to ‘skyp-
ing’ a friend in another country. The changes wrought by the communications 
and information technologies of the last decade are arguably unprecedented. 
The interconnectedness of life in the developed world and its impact on our 
lives has been well documented by a large number of scholars. The breadth 
and depth of scholarship is detailed and multi-disciplinary. 
The regulation of networked communications and information technology 
systems is a contentious subject. The internet, in all its layered complexity, 
has seriously challenged the ability of national governments to regulate its 
uses and abuses. Bennett-Moses makes the point that technologies such as 
the Internet ‘motivate legal change by their very existence’. (Bennett-Moses, 
2007, p. 4) Bennett-Moses explains:
Technologies such as railroads, genetic testing, in vitro fertilization, 
computing and the internet were not designed to evade the law or 
employ it for gain, but rather were created for independent reasons. 
Their relationship with the law is not intentional. (Bennett-Moses, 
2007, p. 4)
The traditional means of regulating through the legislative silos of telecom-
munications, radiocommunications and broadcasting have been pushed to 
the limit by the internet and emerging technologies (Chapman, 2008, p. 2) 
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These new ‘mediums’ do not fit into the old regulatory categories. The 
regulatory body responsible for the communications environment, the 
Australian Media and Communications Authority (ACMA), operates as a 
semiconverged regulator and considers its legacy legislation in terms of 
‘broken concepts’ (Chapman, 2008, p. 2).  There are serious jurisdictional and 
structural issues still to be solved as each new technology comes online.
As a result of the enabling capability of communications and informa-
tion technology systems, many participants in the current debate on the ‘war 
on terror’ believe that the communications environment has facilitated the 
introduction of unprecedented ‘microregulation’, ‘command and control’ 
technologies and solutions and cradle to grave surveillance (Michael & 
Michael, 2006, p. 360).  Some view the developments of the last decade as 
a shift towards a surveillance society where privacy is traded for access to 
goods and services (Tregoning, 2006, p. 194). 
Australians are subject to video surveillance in public places and 
private spaces. Australians leave digital tracks all over the communications 
environment. Our communications are able to be tracked and traced, stored and 
accessed with greater ease than perhaps any other time in history. This perspec-
tive is somewhat at odds with the values underpinning the regulation of the 
communications environment. Those values are partly based on competition, 
full and open access, efficiency and speed (Raiche, 2005, p. 1). The impact 
of technology based surveillance regulation on networks is thought, on one 
level, to be costly, intrusive and an impediment to network efficiency (Branch, 
2003, p. 38). In some sectors, it is also thought of as an infringement of basic 
democratic, human rights, such as privacy and free speech. 
Large media and telecommunications companies are strategically 
aligned with the Federal government over national security policy agenda 
through their involvement in the Business-Government Taskforce on Critical 
Infrastructure. Bull and Craig’s research shows that all levels of government 
in Australia have recognised the need for critical infrastructure protection and 
identifies information technology and communications as critical infrastructure 
(Bull & Craig, 2006, p. 211). The strategic alliance between government and 
industry in the area of critical infrastructure protection seeks to strengthen 
the alignment of communications regulation with national security policy 
(Business-Government Taskforce on Critical Infrastructure Report, 2002, 
p. 2). The Business-Government Taskforce on Critical Infrastructure Report 
makes the following observation: 
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Critical infrastructure protection is a complex issue with links to almost 
every industry sector. It is not possible to separate neatly the need to 
protect critical infrastructure from physical attack, and the need to assure 
the operation of the national information infrastructure. The Business/
Government Task Force has considered a wide range of issues, and has 
developed six recommendations. The recommendations are based on 
the principles of fostering a partnership between the public and private 
sectors, creating a culture of security addressing both IT and physical 
security concerns, and building on the work of existing security and 
consequence management arrangements. The Task Force recommends 
that a network of consultative groups be formed to address both policy 
and operational information sharing needs of business and government. 
(Business-Government Taskforce on Critical Infrastructure Report, 
2002, p. 2)
There has been significant collaboration and co-operation at the level of 
infrastructure protection. However the public record of industry engage-
ment over the post-9/11 expansion of telecommunications interception and 
surveillance powers demonstrates a far less dedicated level of interest. This 
however can be contrasted with the actions of the media entities who formed 
the ‘Australia’s right to know’ campaign in an attempt to heighten commu-
nity awareness and government responsiveness to their business concerns 
about the ‘chilling effect’ of the national security content regulation on free 
speech and access to information (Murphy, 2007, p.5; Moore, 2007, p.1).  
The relationship between government and industry needs to be more 
fully appreciated and explored, in order for citizens and businesses to under-
stand the impact of the national security legislative framework on Australian 
society and its governance. An understanding of the roles that are played by 
communications industry participants is crucial for a clearer picture of the 
regulatory landscape and its compliance and accountability framework. New 
technologies and innovations challenge the existing communications regula-
tory frameworks, including the relationships which many take for granted. 
This is no easy undertaking. The regulatory framework must grapple with 
the live streaming of ‘Big Brother’ over the internet (Idato, 2006, p. 6) to 
pornography on hand-held communications devices; from social networking 
sites and other advanced internet technologies (Pascu et al., 2007, pp. 12-13) 
to off-shore gambling servers.  Idato makes the comment that: 
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Next-generation technology provides a range of solutions to the  
dilemma of managing controversial TV content and controlling who has 
access to it - smart-classification software that can control what can be 
watched and when, parental lock systems that can put entire channels 
out of the hands of children, and more. But rather than innovate, the 
government has hamstrung itself by kowtowing to the medieval fief-
doms that control our increasingly anachronistic broadcast TV sector. 
(Idato, 2006, p. 6)
Finally, the communications regulatory framework must grapple with the 
changed relationship between communications industry stakeholders and 
the state. There are many more creators and potential creators, facilitators 
and aggregators of ‘telecommunications data’ in a converged communica-
tions environment than the simple carrier/carriage service provider/content 
service provider categorisation of traditional telecommunications and 
broadcasting regulation. These developments open up issues of liability, 
compliance, criminal responsibility and cost, which are of concern to commu-
nications industry stakeholders (Nicholls & Rowland, 2007, p. 83). In relation 
to the post-9/11 amendments to the telecommunications interception regime in 
particular, communications industry stakeholders have felt obliged to 
accommodate the government and its national security policy objectives 
without questioning (or arguably, being able to question) the impact or 
potential long term impact on their customers or their businesses (Nicholls 
& Rowland, 2007, p. 83). 
Conclusion
Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in Australia and interna-
tionally, it is arguable that the paradigm of security, national security and its 
discourse have been ‘waxing’ to use the parlance often used in respect of the 
defence power under the Australian constitution. 
Our technologically connected lifestyle enables pervasive, more 
accurate surveillance; less privacy; and direct targeting of political dissidence 
justified on the basis of ‘national security’ (which is as intangible and elusive 
and as difficult to safely define as ‘terrorism’) (Tregoning, 2004, p. 169). 
New services such as MySpace and FaceBook have seriously challenged 
the value of privacy in that context.  Not only have those services opened up 
the potential for ‘cradle to grave’ surveillance (Michael & Michael, 2006, 
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p. 360), the cultural development moves the debate beyond privacy to the 
issue of communicative freedom, which is arguably a broader concept encom-
passing an individual’s choices about the access, use and disclosure of their 
information (Bowrey, 2005, p. 178). 
However, as for what this may mean for the future of communications 
regulation in Australia, Hills makes this point in respect of the UK and the 
US which is arguably true for Australia:
Today, the internationalisation of communications has created a  
situation where, in the interests of security, the relation of government 
to citizens is focused on fear, suspicion and surveillance, not democracy 
and the protection of human rights.
In order to do something about this, this article, by highlighting the 
‘convergences and tactical linkages’ at the interface of national security and 
communications regulation, has tried to provide some suggestions of policy 
areas requiring greater future consideration and discussion amongst citizens, 
business and government. National security deserves recognition amongst 
the other ‘top six trends’ in communications policy today, as it raises 
important matters about  the future of a vibrant communications environ-
ment which is as Hills notes ‘necessary in a democratic industrialised society 
for people to fulfill their roles as citizens’ (Hills, 2006, p. 195). 
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